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ESSAYS
Are Kentucky's Children "At Risk"
as a Result of J.H. v. Commonwealth?*
BYDUANEF OSBORNE**
J essical is a five-year-old girl who lives with her four-year-old sister,
Kayla, her mother, and her mother's paramour.2 The paramour,
Eddie Johnson, has recently been released from pnsonj after serving
a five-year sentence for raping and sodomizmg his five-year-old biological
daughter. The children's mother, Carolyn Spencer, is aware that Mr. Johnson
pled guilty to rape and sodomy of is daughter; however, she is convinced he
is now a changed man.
Jessica has disclosed to her counselor at school that, for the last six
months, she has been visited by Mr. Johnson while in her own bedroom, and
he has hurt her by putting his "tail" into her private area. In response, the
* This Essay is inspired by numerous attempts by defense attorneys to seek the
return of children who have been removed from their parents or caretakers for
being "at risk" of abuse or neglect.
Assistant Fayette County Attorney
All names used in connection with this hypothetical are fictitious. Any
resemblance to actual persons, living or dead, is purely coincidental.
"Paramour" means, in this instance, a live-in boyfriend who exercises care,
custody, and control of the children. Juvenile dependency actions govern abusive
or neglectful situations involving parents or persons exercising case, custody, and
control over a child. See KY. REV STAT. ANN. [hereinafter K.R.S.] § 600.020(1)
(Michie 1990) as amended by House Bill 142, Regular Session (Ky. 1998), signed
into law by Gov. Paul E. Patton on Mar. 17, 1998 (defining an abused or neglected
child as one "whose health or welfare is harmed or threatened with harm when his
parent, guardian or otherperson exercising custodial control or supervision of the
child" inflicts harm upon the child or allows to be created a risk of harm (emphasis
added)).
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school counselor telephones the Cabinet for Families and Children's hotline.3
A social worker from the Cabinet for Families and Children immediately
investigates the matter.4 Jessica's school counselor is present at the initial
questioning of Jessica about how her private area was hurt. The counselor is
nervous that there will be retaliation against her by the perpetrator of the
sexual abuse if this matter goes to court.5 Jessica tells the same story to the
social worker that she told to her counselor. Therefore, the social worker
obtains an emergency custody order6 from the distnct judge of the county in
which Jessica resides. The social worker then takes Jessica to a doctor, who
performs a colposcope examination7 to determine whether there is physical
evidenceto substantiate Jessica's allegations of sexual abuse. The colposcope
reveals that Jessica's hymen is torn in a manner the doctor believes to be the
result of physical trauma almost certainly caused by penile penetration.
Jessica tells the examining physician that "Eddie hurt me down there," when
she is questioned about how she got hurt.'
' Section 620.030 of the Kentucky Revised Statutes, commonly referred to as
Kentucky's reporting statute, places an affirmative duty upon "any person" who
knows or has reasonable cause to believe that a child is dependent, neglected, or
abused. Section 620.040(3) prohibits school personnel from conducting "internal
investigations m lieu of the official investigations." The school counselor, however,
still has the obligation under section 620.030 to report the alleged abuse to the
Cabinet for Families and Children. The idea behind this law is that some school
officials would not want the general public to know that there are abused children
in their school or would possibly hinder or cover up that fact m deference to
parents.
4 See K.R.S. § 620.040.
5 Kentucky law provides some protection, in that anyone who acts upon
"reasonable cause" in making a report or who acts in "good faith," enjoys
immunity from civil or criminal liability Id. § 620.050.
6Section 620.060 was amended by House Bill 142, Regular Session (Ky 1998),
signed into law by Gov Paul E. Patton on Mar. 17, 1998.
' A colposcope is a medical device that allows a physician to enter the vaginal
or anal cavity of a child to more closely examine the child in order to ascertain
whether trauma has occurred in the area.
8 Drumm v. Commonwealth, 783 S.W.2d 380 (Ky 1990), is the leading
Kentucky case addressing whether Jessica's statement to the doctor regarding who
hurt her would be admissible in trial. In Drumm, a three-year-old girl and her older
brother told a psychiatrist that their parents had been sexually abusing them. The
psychiatrist initially saw the children in his role as an investigator hired by the
Department of Social Services ("DSS"). He subsequently treated the children for
three years for emotional trauma resulting from sexual abuse. At trial, the
prosecution called the psychiatrist to testify about the children's statements under
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The social worker next meets with Carolyn, Jessica's mother. Carolyn
refuses to believe that Eddie could have sexually abused Jessica. Eddie, who
is also present during this interview, demes that he has ever touched any child
improperly, and asks to speakwithhis lawyer. The social worker is concerned
for the safety of both Jessica and her four-year-old sister, Kayla, if Eddie
remains m the home. Eddie is not willing to leave the house and Carolyn
refuses to ask Eddie to leave the residence. It probably will be at least a few
days before the police charge Eddie with rape, but even if he is arrested, he
may post bond, return to the home, and sexually molest Jessica or Kayla,
since Carolyn is not willing to protect her children. Therefore, the Cabinet for
Families and Children, through the county attorney, files a petition m district
court9 and requests a second emergency custody order to remove Kayla from
her home. There is no evidence from interviewing Kayla, however, that she
has ever been improperly touched by Mr. Johnson. Kayla appears extremely
uncomfortable when the social worker asks her if she has ever been sexually
abused.
May Kayla - a child who might not have been sexually abused by Mr.
Johnson, but who is at risk of sexual abuse by him -be found to be an "abused
child,"'" and removed from her mother and Mr. Johnson? A cursory
the medical diagnosis or treatment exception to the hearsay rule. The defense
objected, stating that because the psychiatrist initially had been employed as part
oftheDSS investigative team, it was impossible to differentiate between statements
made to him when he was treating the children and statements made to him when
he was wearing his "detective hat." Id. at 384. The Supreme Court of Kentucky
held that for purposes of admissibility, the distinction between a statement made
to a treating physician and a testifying physician was no longer relevant: both types
of testimony are admissible. The court noted, however, that trial courts may give
less weight to out-of-court statements not made for treatment since they are
inherently less reliable than those made fortreatment. See id. at385. Drumm is also
discussed in Robert G. Lawson's survey article, Evidence, in this volume, at 776-
79.
9 The district court has concurrent jurisdiction pursuant to section 610.010 of
the Kentucky Revised Statutes in regard to the removal of the children, although
Mr. Johnson will be criminally prosecuted in a separate court. Thejuvenile session
of the district court, commonly referred to as "Dependency Court," has civil
jurisdiction over the removal of these children and the plan, if any, for reunification
of the family
'
0 See K.R.S. § 600.020(1). An abused or neglected child is one:
whose health orwelfare is harmed or threatened with harm when his parent,
guardian, or other person exercising custodial control or supervision of the
child:
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examination of Judge Combs' opinion m J.H. v. Commonwealth' could lead
one to the conclusion that Kayla could not be protected as an "abused" child;
but upon further review, it becomes apparent that the confusing language that
might indicate this result is dicta and would not be applicable to a child in
Kayla's situation. Most importantly, J.H. does not even address the issue of
"risk."
In J.H. v. Commonwealth, the Bell District Court found two children,
ages five and two, to be "dependent, neglected or abused children' 2 and
removed them from their natural parent. The family already had a lengthy
istory with the Cabinet for Families and Children when the removal of the
children occurred. Largely, questions revolved around whether the parents
properly supervisedthe children.13 OnMay 27, 1987, the five-year-old, C.H.,
had wandered about 150 yards from hIs home and been kicked in the head by
a horse, suffering a fractured skull. The Cabinet for Families and Children 4
initiated proceedings" in Bell District Court to remove both the five-year-old
child and the two-year-old child from the custody oftheirparents. The district
(a) Inflicts or allows to be inflicted upon the child physical or
emotional injury by other than accidental means;
(b) Creates or allows to be created a risk of physical or emotional
injury to the child by other than accidental means;
(c) Engages m a pattern of conduct that renders the parent mcapable
of caring for the immediate and ongoing needs of the child
(d) Continously or repeatedly fails or refuses to provide essential
prenatal care and protection for the child, considering the age of the
child;
(e) Commits or allows to be committed an act of sexual abuse, sexual
exploitation, or prostitution upon the child;
(f) Creates or allows to be created a risk that an act of sexual abuse,
sexual exploitation, or prostitution will be committed upon the child
Id. as amended by House Bill 142, Regular Session (Ky 1998), signed into law by
Gov. Paul E. Patton on Mar. 17, 1998 (emphasis added).
"J.H. v. Commonwealth, 767 S.W.2d 330 (Ky Ct. App. 1988).
The Kentucky Court of Appeals noted the statutory impossibility of the Bell
District Court purportedly finding the children to be both "dependent" and "abused
or neglected" at the same time. See id. at 333.
'
3See id. at 332.
'4 In 1987, the Cabinet for Families and Children was called the Cabinet for
Human Resources.
"5 "Proceedings" means an emergency custody order and a petition filed in the
district court pursuant to sections 620.010-.990.
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court granted the Bell county attorney's motion for a temporary removal,' 6
and ruled that based upon the "pervasive 'neglectful situation"" 7 that led to
C.H.'s injury, there were reasonable grounds to believe that both children
would be dependent, neglected, or abused if returned to or left in the custody
of their parents."
The mother appealedthe Bell District Court's decision to the Bell Circuit
Court, 9 which affirmed the district court's decision." The mother then
requested relief from the Kentucky Court of Appeals.2 ' After hearing
arguments, the court of appeals vacated the judgment of the Bell District
Court in regard to C.H., the five-year-old child who was jured,' and the
judgment ofthe Bell District Courtinregardto T.H., the two-year-old sibling,
was reversed.' This Essay is primarily concerned with the appellate court's
reasoning in its reversal of the Bell District Court's decision as to the younger
child, who was not injured. 4
In the written opinion, Judge Combs stated that the removal of the
youngest child was improper because evidence proving abuse or neglect of
one child could not be used to infer that another child m the same household
16 Section 620.080 governs temporary removal hearings m dependency
situations. Once a child is removed from a parent or a person exercising care,
custody, and control, a temporary removal hearing must take place "within 72
hours, excluding weekends and holidays, of the time when the emergency custody
order [was issued by the district court judge] or when [the] child is taken into
custody without the consent of his parent or other person exercising custodial
control or supervision." Id. at § 620.080(l)(a); see also 905 K.A.R. 1:230 § 3. If
the child is not removed from his or her parent, but the Cabinet has filed a petition
of abuse, neglect, or dependency, the Cabinet must go to hearing within 10 days
of the date it filed the petition. See K.R.S. § 620.080(l)(b).
17 J.H., 767 S.W.2d at 333 (quoting prosecuting attorney).
s See id.
'9 The law states that "any party aggrieved by a proceeding under KRS
610.010(1)(e) may appeal from the Juvenile Court to the Circuit Court as a matter
of right in the manner provided in the Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure." K.R.S.
§ 620.155.20 SeeJ.H., 767 S.W.2d at 330.
21 See id.
' Because the court of appeals could not tell what the Bell District Court's
judgment was - that is, whether C.H. was dependent or neglected or abused - it
could neither affirm nor reverse and, therefore, could only vacate the "impossible"
disposition. Id. at 333; see also supra note 12.23 See J.H., 767 S.W.2d at 334.
24 Judge Combs wrote the opinion for the appellate panel, Judge Lester
concurred with the opinion, and Judge Gudgel concurred in the result only
10031997-98]
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is also being abused or neglected.' "This reasoning," he insisted, "runs
against the gram of not only the Juvenile Code, but also the notion of
constitutional due process of law and familial realities as well. 26 The legal
assumptions underlying Judge Combs' assessment, however, are incorrect.
First, the Kentucky Juvenile Code recognizes that upon some occasions,
in order to protect and preserve the rights and needs of children, it is
necessary to remove a child from his or her parents.27 Kentucky statutory law
clearly allows for the removal of children who are in "imminent danger" of
physical injury or sexual abuse.28 The plain meaning of the words "imminent
danger" is that a child is at risk of some type of injury or improper care
occurring. It does not imply that a child must actually be Injured to be
removed from harm. Moreover, Kentucky statutory law clearly states that
parents and custodians who either create anon-accidental risk ofharm to their
children or allow such a risk to be created are subjecting their children to
abuse or neglect.29 If the legislature meant to include only children who had
been injured, and not children who are exposed to the risk of injury, then most
certainly these statutes would have reflected that intent.
Second, in J.H. the Cabinet did not provide any evidence to the Bell
District Court to show that T.H., the two-year-old sibling, was at risk of being
hurt as well. The prosecution presented its theory of pervasive neglect," and
the social worker testified that it was the policy of her office to "seek removal
of all the children in the home" if one child were removed.31 In fact, the
istrictjudge toldthe mother that "for the record, forpurposes of your appeal,
should you end up prosecuting one, I'll state that there's really nothing in the
record to base the Court's finding on because there has been no evidence in
the record."32
On review, the court of appeals rejected the prosecution's pervasive
neglect argument and noted that even ifthe prosecution had offered evidence
of such neglect, removal still would have been improper:
25 See J.H., 767 S.W.2d at 333.
2 6 Id.
27 See K.R.S. § 620.0 10 as amended by House Bill 142, Regular Session (Ky.
1998), signed into law by Gov Paul E. Patton on Mar. 17, 1998.
21 See id. § 620.060(1).
29 See id. § 600.020 as amended by House Bill 142, Regular Session (Ky
1998), signed into law by Gov Paul E. Patton on Mar. 17, 1998.
3 0 See J.H., 767 S.W.2d at 333.
31 Id. This is not the official policy of the Cabinet for Families and Children
state-wide.32 Id.
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[T]here always will be multi-child households where one child is physically
or mentally handicapped with a brother or a sister who is physically and
mentally healthy. These families unquestionablypresent situations where the
lack ofthat utmost degree of attentiveness, care and control, appropriate and
necessary for the much younger or afflicted child does not mean that the
older or healthy child is also dependent, or, neglected or abused. The
Commonwealth is constitutionally, statutorily and realistically prohibited
from taking its evidence and inferentially leapfrogging from child to child
in its efforts to remove them from their natural parents.33
In the hypothetical laid out at the begiuning of this Essay, it is completely
foreseeable that some clever defense attorney might attempt to confuse a
district judge faced with the decision whether to remove an at-risk child like
Kayla by citing J.H. out of context and implying more than it states. The
defense might argue that Kayla could not be removed from her mother,
Carolyn, and her mother's paramour, Eddie, since even if Eddie had sexually
abused Jessica, there was no evidence that Kayla had been sexually abused
as well. After all, according to JH., the Cabinet could not be permitted to use
evidence related to Jessica to "inferentially leapfrog" from Jessica to Kayla
in order to justify the removal of both children. Fortunately for Kayla, the
removal petition filed on her behalf would be completely justified under the
Kentucky Juvenile Code.
In Jessica's case, J.H. must be carefully distinguished. J.H. dealt with
neglect, not abuse, in the family home. Because of this, all language in that
opinion regarding abuse cases is clearly dicta. The dicta contained m J.H. v.
Commonwealth shouldnot be applied beyond the fact pattern of that case and
certainly should not be extended beyond neglect cases.
Further, the Kentucky Court of Appeals was wrong when it stated that
constitutionally and statutorily, a court may not look at the situation of one
child when considering whether a sibling is m danger of becoming an abused
child. 4 The court mJ.H. stated, "The process that is due [to parents] includes
preponderant proof that each child sought to be removed is dependent, or,
neglected or abused."' The court of appeals cited two cases, Quilloin v.
33Id. at 334.
See id. at 333-34.35Id. at 333 (emphasis added). In a case very similar to J.H, Matter ofEdwards,
335 N.Y.S.2d 575 (Fam. Ct. 1972), a petition for removal was filed regarding M.E.
upon a diagnosis of trauma-related shoulder injury and medical neglect. In
addition, M.E. had sustained previous injuries that could not be explained as being
caused by accident. On the basis of the present abuse and neglect of M.E. (and
consideration of past abuse), the Richmond County Family Court extended the
1997-98] 1005
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Walcott 6 and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 7 for the proposition that due process
prohibits considering such evidence.
The United States Supreme Court made it very clear in Quilloin that the
relationship between parent and child is constitutionally protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment. The Supreme Court also stated that there is little
doubt that if the state were breaking up a natural family "without some
showing ofunfitness and for the sole reason that to do so was thought to be in
the children's best interest," a violation of the Due Process Clause would
occur.3 9 The Court in Quilloin, however, does not remotely suggest that a
court cannot look at injuries to a sibling to determine if another child, who has
not yet been abused, can be removed for risk of abuse. In our hypothetical,
certainly Jessica's mother would not argue or maintain that Mr. Johnson's
raping and sodomizing five-year-old Jessica is to be included in the
"'freedom ofpersonal choice in matters of family life protectedby the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."' 4 0 The language in
Quilloin makes it clear that due process is not violated where there is a
showing of unfitness. In the hypothetical discussed earlier, Kayla would be
at risk of abuse as a result of the unfitness of her caretakers, specifically
removal petition to cover M.E.'s brother, R.E., holding:
Although there is not one scintilla of evidence to show abuse or neglect
of the child [R.E.], to remove the child from the home is not a violation of
due process or a violation of [the parents'] constitutional rights.
There has already been a finding after a long fact finding hearing, of
child abuse and neglect against the respondent parents as to child [M.E.] on
the original child abuse petition.
The record is therefore sufficient to make the conclusion inescapable
that the other child [R.E.] is likely to suffer serious harm from improper
guardianship.
Id. at 580.The family court declared that when the "warning flags from the storm
of abuse and neglect are still flying and there is a clear and present danger" to the
other child in the home, id. at 581, a court must remove the other child to protect
him from imminent risk to life or health, see id. at 580-82 (citing Schenck v United
States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919)).
36 Quilloin v Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978).
31 Wisconsi v Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
38 See Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 255.391 Id. (emphasis added).
40 Id. (quoting Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639-40
(1974)).
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demonstrated by Mr. Johnson having raped Jessica and her mother being
unwilling to take steps necessary to protect Kayla from the same fate.
The other case cited byJ.H. is Wisconsin v. Yoder 4 This case involved
the issue of whether Amish parents could be prosecuted for not sending their
children to school after they reached the age of fourteen.42 The case dealt
entirely with the state'sjurisdictionto interfere with the religious upbringing
of a child. This case is not on point with the hypothetical, nor with the facts
ofJ.H.
Finally, when the J.H. court stated that statutorily a child could not be
held to be an abused child based on evidence of abuse of another child, it
ignored an important portion of the Juvenile Code. The definition of an
abused or neglected child includes a child who is "threatened with harm" or
is subjected to a "risk" of physical, emotional, or sexual mjury 43 The
legislature has made it crystal clear that Kentucky's Juvenile Code does not
require a court or the Cabinet for Families and Children to wait until an actual
physical or sexual mjury occurs before a child can be removed from his
caretaker. The JH. court completely ignored this portion of the Kentucky
Juvenile Code, which expressly protects a child who is subjected to the risk
of injury or sexual abuse.
Kayla is therefore constitutionally and statutorily protected from being
exposed to the risk of sexual abuse suffered by her sister. Since Jessica
appears to have been abused,' and her mother is unable or unwilling to take
the necessary steps to protect Kayla,45 Kentucky law clearly defines Kayla as
an "abused child."
In conclusion, the case of J.H. must be distinguished from almost any
other juvenile-at-risk case on several grounds. First, since the J.H. fact
4" Wisconsin v Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
42 See id. at 207-13.
43 K.R.S. § 600.020(1) (Michie 1990). See supra note 10. In addition, the
regulations provide specific guidance on assessing risk to surviving children, and
removing them if necessary, where there has been a child fatality in the home. See
905 K.A.R. 1:330 §§ 13, 14(1-5). After a child fatality, the social worker must
conduct an immediate assessment to assure the safety of the remaining children.
See id. § 14(5).
44A preponderance-of-the-evidence standard applies, pursuant to section
620.100(3). See also J.H. v Cabinet for Human Resources, 767 S.W.2d 330, 332
(Ky. Ct. App. 1988).45 See K.R.S. § 620.060(1)(c), as amended by House Bill 142, signed into law
by Gov Paul E. Patton on Mar. 17, 1998.46 See id. § 600.020, as amended by House Bill 142, signed into law by Gov
Paul E. Patton on Mar. 17, 1998.
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scenario involved neglect only, all statements in the opinion regarding abuse
are dicta. Second, the court of appeals' refusal to even consider"nsk" directly
contradicts an essential part of Kentucky's Juvenile Code that allows the
Cabinet for Families and Children to protect children from harm before they
are actually subjected to abuse or neglect. Finally, the legislative purpose of
Kentucky's Juvenile Code is to protect children who, like Kayla, are at risk
of abuse or neglect, but are fortunate enough not to have been directly
exposed to abuse.
The answer to the question of whether Kentucky's children are "at risk'
as a result ofJ.H. v. Commonwealth is not so clear, though. Ifjudges take the
time to examine this case carefully, as has been done in this Essay, the answer
is probably "no."
